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Abstract
Recently, Dziembowski et al. introduced the notion of non-malleable
codes (NMC), inspired from the notion of non-malleability in cryptogra-
phy and the work of Gennaro et al. in 2004 on tamper proof security.
Informally, when using NMC, if an attacker modifies a codeword, decod-
ing this modified codeword will return either the original message or a
completely unrelated value.
The definition of NMC is related to a family of modifications autho-
rized to the attacker. In their paper, Dziembowski et al. propose a con-
struction valid for the family of all bit-wise independent functions.
In this article, we study the link between the second version of the
Wire-Tap (WT) Channel, introduced by Ozarow and Wyner in 1984, and
NMC. Using coset-coding, we describe a new construction for NMC w.r.t.
a subset of the family of bit-wise independent functions. Our scheme is
easier to build and more efficient than the one proposed by Dziembowski
et al.
1 Introduction
In cryptography, the non-malleability property [1] requires that it is impossible,
given a ciphertext, to produce another different ciphertext so that the corre-
sponding plaintexts are related to each other. Non-malleability under adaptive
chosen-ciphertext attack (NM-CCA2) is one of the strongest computational se-
curity property that is required from an asymmetric encryption scheme (it is
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equivalent to indistinguishability under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (IND-
CCA2)).
Recently, Dziembowski et al. [2] proposed a transposition of the crypto-
graphic definition of non-malleability to the field of coding theory. Informally,
they define a NMC as a code such that, when a codeword is subject to modifi-
cations, its decoding procedure either corrects these errors and decodes to the
original message or returns a value that is completely unrelated to the original
message.
The property of non-malleability, as defined in [2], is subject to a choice of a
family of modifications that we allow an adversary to make on the codewords.
Dziembowski et al. also proved that it is impossible for a code to be non-
malleable w.r.t. the set of all possible modifications of codewords.
The motivation for NMC is tamperproofness. The authors of [2] were indeed
much influenced by the work of Gennaro et al. [3]. Non-malleability can be useful
in real-life applications. Some storage devices may be assumed to be “read-
proof” because of a sufficient amount of physical or algorithmic protections to
prevent anyone from learning the data stored on them. However, even if one
cannot read the data, injecting faults in the data and observing the way it
affects functions using these data can help to recover them. Injecting faults can
be done for instance using lasers [4]. There exists an important literature on
how to use Differential Fault Analysis to break cryptosystems (e.g. [5, 6]).
Dziembowski et al. studied deeply the non-malleability w.r.t. bit-wise in-
dependent tampering functions, i.e. modifications that affect each bit of the
codeword independently: flipping the bit or setting it to 0 or 1. This is typi-
cally what can be done using fault injections and, consequently, focusing on this
family of tampering functions is worthwhile.
In [2], a construction for NMC w.r.t. all bit-wise independent functions is
proposed. However, an implementable construction is left as an open problem.
Our goal is to propose NMC that can be explicitly built. To this end, we exploit
a relation that can be established between the model for NMC and the second
version of the Wire-Tap channel [7]. This allows us to prove how coset-coding
can be used to build a NMC. Furthermore, the decoding procedure of linear-
coset coding consists uniquely of one matrix-vector product. Our construction
is thus computationally efficient. Moreover, unlike their solution, our procedure
always decodes messages whereas theirs is closer to error detection and often
returns an error symbol.
Organization of the Paper
In Section 2, we explain and give the formal definitions for NMC as established
in [2]. We describe the model of the WT channel in Section 3 and explain the use
of coset-coding. We show how the second version of the WT channel and NMC
w.r.t. bit-wise independent functions are related and prove why coset-coding
can be used as a NMC in Section 4. We finally conclude in Section 5.
2
2 Non-Malleable Codes
In this section, we intend to give an easy-to-understand description of NMC and
their goals. All definitions come from [2].
In the following, we consider a randomized encoding function Enc : {0, 1}k 7→
{0, 1}n, which is associated to a deterministic decoding function Dec : {0, 1}n 7→
{0, 1}k ∪ {⊥}, where ⊥ means that the codeword cannot be decoded. Let F2
denote the field with two elements.
2.1 The Tampering Experiment
Let us first introduce the situation considered in NMC. In this model, a source
message m is encoded using Enc, in order to be later decoded using Dec. The
codeword c = Enc(m) is stored on a device or sent over a channel before being
decoded. During this phase, an attacker applies some tampering function f
belonging to a given family of functions F ⊂ Fn
2
F
n
2 . A tampered codeword c˜ =
f(c) is thus obtained. This erroneous codeword is then decoded to m˜ = Dec(c˜).
This process is described in Figure 1.
Enc f Dec
m c c˜ m˜
Figure 1: The Tampering Experiment
Now focus on the behaviour of the attacker, called Eve in the following.
Eve applies a function f ∈ F to the codeword c, but she does not read c. In
the real world, this can be seen as injecting faults on a device that you cannot
read (e.g. a smart-card) using, for instance, a laser. In this experiment, Eve
can however read the resulting decoded message m˜ and try to learn as much as
possible about m from m˜. Let us also specify that f is a deterministic function
and, furthermore, that Eve knows which function she has chosen in F .
2.2 Defining Non-Malleability
Let us now give the formal definition of non-malleability. Let F be a family of
tampering functions. For each f ∈ F , we define a random variable Tamperfs
corresponding to the tampering experiment described in the previous section:
Tamperfs =
{
c←R Enc(s), c˜ = f(c), s˜ = Dec(c˜)
Output : s˜
}
The randomness is induced by the encoding function Enc.
The Non-Malleability property is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Non-Malleability). Let (Enc,Dec) be a coding scheme, where
Enc : {0, 1}k 7→ {0, 1}n is random and Dec : {0, 1}n 7→ {0, 1}k ∪ {⊥} determin-
istic. Let F ⊂ Fn
2
F
n
2 be a family of tampering functions.
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We say that the coding scheme (Enc,Dec) is non-malleable w.r.t. F if for
each f ∈ F , there exists a distribution Df over {0, 1}
k ∪ {⊥, same} such that,
∀s ∈ {0, 1}k, we have:
Tamperfs ≈


s˜← Df
Output
{
s if s˜ = same
s˜ otherwise

 (1)
where ≈ denotes computational or statistical indistinguishability.
2.3 Explaining the Definition
First, notice that the definition is relative to a family F of tampering functions,
but the property of indistinguishability concerns each function f separately.
Non-malleability w.r.t. a family is in fact non-malleability w.r.t. each function
in this family.
Now let us recall what we expect from a NMC. We want that, after the tam-
pering experiment, either the codeword c˜ is well-decoded to the original message
s despite the tampering or the decoding procedure results in a value s˜ that is
unrelated to the original message. That is the idea behind the distribution Df :
either it returns the symbol same, meaning that the decoding furnishes the
original value or it returns a value s˜ ∈ {0, 1}k ∪ {⊥}. As Df depends only on f
and not on the message s, in the latter case, the value returned in the second
part of Equation (1) is unrelated to s.
2.4 Basic Examples
We summarize here two examples developed in [2] that correspond to usual
families of codes encompassed by the definition of NMC.
Error Correction
Let us assume that F is a family of tampering functions and C an error-
correcting code such that errors introduced by the application of a function
f ∈ F on any codeword of C can be corrected. Then C is non-malleable w.r.t.
F . The distribution associated to every function f ∈ F is the constant distri-
bution Df = same, since erroneous codewords are always well-decoded.
Error Detection
The same idea can be applied to error-detecting codes. If there is a family
F of tampering functions such that each f ∈ F introduces errors in every
codeword that are detected by a code C, then C is non-malleable w.r.t. F .
The distribution associated to every function f ∈ F is the constant distribution
Df = ⊥.
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2.5 General (Im)Possibility Results
Impossibility
As proven in [2], no code is non-malleable w.r.t. the set of all possible tampering
functions (i.e. F = Fn
2
F
n
2 ). Indeed there is, for instance, in F a function that
decodes the codeword, “increments” the message (i.e. adds 1 to its representa-
tion in Fk
2
) and re-encodes it. The result of the decoding of such a tampered
codeword would always be s+1 and thus would be neither the original message
s nor an unrelated value.
Possibility
In [2], the authors prove that for any bounded-sized family of tampering func-
tions, there exists a NMC. Their result is summed up in the following theorem:
Theorem 1 ( [2]). Let F ⊂ Fn
2
F
n
2 be a family of tampering functions such that
n > log(log(|F|)). Then there exists a non-malleable code w.r.t. F .
2.6 Bit-wise Independent Tampering
Bit-wise independent tampering is a special case of tampering where each bit of
the codeword is tampered with independently. Formally a function f : {0, 1}n 7→
{0, 1}n is bit-wise independent if we can find n independent functions f1, . . . , fn :
{0, 1} 7→ {0, 1} such that ∀x ∈ {0, 1}n, f(x) = (f1(x), . . . , fn(x)). There are four
possibilities for each fi which we denote by keep, flip, 0 and 1 (keep and flip
are explicit, 0 (resp. 1) is the function that sets a bit to 0 (resp. 1) regardless
of what it was before).
In [2], a construction for a NMC w.r.t. the family of all bit-wise independent
functions is introduced. It uses Linear Error-Correcting Secret-Sharing (LECSS)
schemes [8] and Algebraic Manipulation Detection (AMD) codes [9]. Both are
quite new tools and even the authors of [2] leave the explicit construction of
LECSS codes as an “interesting open problem”. Furthermore, their solution is
quite close to error detecting codes as it decodes to ⊥ after a tampering in most
cases1.
In Section 4, we propose a new way to build NMC w.r.t. bit-wise independent
functions. Our solution covers less tampering functions but uses more standard
and efficient tools. Moreover, our scheme is neither error-correcting nor error-
detecting (it never returns ⊥) and so, to our opinion, is closer to the original
definition of non-malleability, which is more generic than error detection or
correction.
1In their proof of non-malleability, the authors of [2] distinguish different cases depending
on the considered tampering function (more precisely its number q of 0 and 1 sub-functions)
and the secrecy t of the LECSS scheme. When t < q < n − t, the tampering experiment
always returns ⊥ and when q ≤ t, the scheme is likely to often return ⊥.
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3 The Wire-Tap Channel
In the following, a [n, k, d] linear code denotes a subspace of dimension k of Fn
2
with minimal Hamming distance d.
3.1 Linear Coset Coding
Coset coding is a random encoding used for both models of WT Channel. This
type of encoding uses a [n, k, d] linear code C with a parity-check matrix H .
Let r = n− k. To encode a message m ∈ Fr
2
, one chooses randomly an element
among all x ∈ Fn
2
such that m = Htx. To decode a codeword x, one just applies
the parity-check matrix H and obtains the syndrome of x for the code C, which
is the message m. This procedure is summed up in Figure 2.
Given: C a [n, n− r, d] linear code with a r × n parity-check matrix H
Encode: m ∈ Fr
2
7→R x ∈ F
n
2
s.t. Htx = m
Decode: x ∈ Fn
2
7→ m = Htx
Figure 2: Linear Coset-coding
3.2 The Wire-Tap Channel I
The Wire-Tap Channel was introduced by Wyner [10]. In this model, a sender
Alice sends messages over a potentially noisy channel to a receiver Bob. An
adversary Eve listens to an auxiliary channel, the WT channel, which is a nois-
ier version of the main channel. It was shown that, with an appropriate coding
scheme, the secret message can be conveyed in such a way that Bob has com-
plete knowledge of the secret and Eve does not learn anything. In the special
case where the main channel is noiseless, the secrecy capacity can be achieved
through a linear coset coding scheme. We summarize the WT Chanel I in
Figure 3.
Alice Enc small (or no) noise
big noise
Bob
Eve
m c c′
c′′
Figure 3: The Wire-Tap Channel I
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3.3 The Wire-Tap Channel II
Ten years later, Ozarow and Wyner introduced a second version of the WT
Channel [7]. In this model, both main and WT channels are noiseless. This
time, the disadvantage for Eve is that she can only see messages with erasures:
she has only access to a limited number of bits per codeword. She is however
allowed to choose which bits she can learn. We summarize the Wire-Tap Chanel
II in Figure 4.
Alice Enc
erasures
Bob
Eve
m c
chosen bits of c
Figure 4: The Wire-Tap Channel II
The encoding used in this model is again a coset coding based on a linear
code C, as in the Wire Tap Channel I with a noiseless main channel. Let d⊥
denote the minimal distance of the dual C⊥ of C. One can prove (see [11] for
instance) that, if Eve can access less than d⊥ bits of a codeword, then she gains
no information at all on the associated message.
Linear coset-coding for the WT channel can be efficiently implemented using
LDPC codes [12, 13].
4 From theWire-Tap Channel to Non-Malleable
Codes
For our construction, we only deal with tampering functions that are bit-wise
independent.
4.1 Motivations for Using Wire-Tap
Roughly speaking, in both models, codewords are modified either with random
faults (WT I), adversary-controlled erasures (WT II) or an adversary-controlled
tampering function (NMC). From these modified codewords or their decoding
results, the adversary tries to learn information on the original messages.
The first WT is a little different from the other models because errors are
random and so do not occur in the same number and bit positions every time.
It could however be covered by the definition of NMC if every possible tam-
pering caused by these random errors were included in the family of tampering
functions taken into account by the code.
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Let us now assume that we want to use a linear coset-coding scheme with
a parity-check matrix H as NMC. We cannot be protected against tampering
functions that only add errors (i.e. bit-wise independent functions where the
only choices for each bit are keep or flip). To see why, let F be a family of
such functions. Obviously, for each f ∈ F , there is an error vector e ∈ Fn
2
such
that ∀c ∈ Fn
2
, f(c) = c+e. Let us follow the tampering experiment. Let m ∈ Fr
2
be a source message and c an encoding of m. Say c is tampered to c˜ = c + e.
Decoding results in m˜ = Htc + Hte = m + Hte. Thus, m˜ is always m plus a
constant offset. It is consequently related to m. Linear coset-coding cannot be
non-malleable w.r.t. these “error-only” functions. There must me some 0 and
1 in the tampering.
This is why we consider WT II. Indeed, using 0 and 1 on some bits of
the codewords is, in an information-theoretic sense, like having erasures at the
corresponding locations, as we do not know what was originally there. As WT
II guarantees that no information is leaked from erased codewords encoded
using an appropriate coset-coding scheme, there will be no relation between the
decoded tampered codeword and the original message. That is what motivates
our proposal.
4.2 The Construction
As discussed before, we consider bit-wise independent functions where the sub-
functions are not only keep or flip. Nevertheless, we authorize bit-flips because
if the result of the tampering experiment is unrelated to the original message,
then the result added to a constant offset will also be unrelated to this message.
We state the following theorem:
Theorem 2 (Linear coset-coding as NMC). Let F ⊂ Fn
2
F
n
2 be a family of bit-
wise independent tampering functions such that:
∀f = (f1, . . . , fn) ∈ F , |{i|fi = 0 or fi = 1}| ≥ D.
Let C be a [n, k, d]-linear code such that D > n−d⊥, where d⊥ is the minimal
distance of its dual code C⊥.
Then a linear coset-coding using C is non-malleable w.r.t. F .
4.3 Proof of Non-Malleability
Our proof of non-malleability is inspired from the proof of security of the WT
II in [14].
Let us consider we are in the situation of Theorem 2. Let f = (f1, . . . , fn) ∈
F be a tampering function. Let S01 be the set of all positions i such that fi = 0
or fi = 1. Let Skeep and Sflip be the equivalent sets for keep and flip. Let
e ∈ Fn
2
be such that ∀i = 1, . . . , n, ei = χSflip(i) (where χA denotes the indicator
function of a set A) and ǫ ∈ Fn
2
be such that ǫi = 1 if fi = 1 and ǫi = 0
otherwise. Let h1, ..., hn denote the columns of the parity-check matrix H .
Let m ∈ Fr
2
be a message encoded to c ∈ Fn
2
. Let c˜ = f(c) and m˜ = Hc˜. We
have
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m˜ =
∑
i∈S01
hic˜i +
∑
i∈Skeep
hic˜i +
∑
i∈Sflip
hic˜i
=
∑
i∈S01
hiǫi +
∑
i∈Skeep
hici +
∑
i∈Sflip
hi(ci + ei)
= Htǫ+Hte+
∑
i∈Skeep∪Sflip
hici
(= m+Htǫ+Hte−
∑
i∈S01
hici)
If we want m˜ to be unrelated to m, then we want
∑
i∈Skeep∪Sflip
hici to be
unrelated to m. If the submatrix Hkf made of the columns hi, i ∈ Skeep ∪ Sflip
is of full rank r = n − k, then we gain no information on the corresponding
bits of m, and all values are equiprobable. This is achieved in particular if
|Skeep ∪ Sflip| < d
⊥ (see chapter 9 of [14]).
If D > n − d⊥, then |S01| > n − d
⊥, i.e. n − |Skeep ∪ Sflip| > n − d
⊥ or
|Skeep ∪ Sflip| < d
⊥. The condition of the previous paragraph is thus achieved
if we use the parameters of Theorem 2.
Let us define more formally the distribution Df associated to f . Let Ki,
i ∈ Skeep ∪ Sflip be Bernoulli(1/2) distributions. Then Df = H
tǫ + Hte +∑
i∈Skeep∪Sflip
hiKi. This distribution and the result of the tampering experiment
are identically distributed.
The coset-coding scheme used in Theorem 2 is consequently non-malleable
w.r.t. F .
4.4 Going Further
Towards a Larger Family of Tampering Functions
When comparing our construction to the one of [2], one can relate the LECSS
and our coset-coding scheme. The only requirement that is not fulfilled by linear
coset-coding is a large distance. As the distance of linear coset-coding is 1, we
cannot assume d > n/4 as they do. That is why we cannot directly modify
this construction and replace LECSS with coset-coding in the description of the
code and the proof of non-malleability.
Both LECSS and coset-coding ensure non-malleability when the number of
0 or 1 sub-functions of the tampering function is high enough. To deal with the
case where the number of such functions is low, Dziembowski et al. concatenated
the LECSS with an AMD code. In such a case, the tampering function acts by
adding an error following a fixed distribution (i.e. independent of the codeword)
and the decoding procedure results in ⊥ with high probability because of the
AMD code. Therefore, non-malleability is ensured. Following this idea, it might
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also be possible to encapsulate our coset-coding scheme within an error-detecting
or an error-correcting code. Thus we would achieve non-malleability w.r.t. a
larger family of functions. In particular, functions with a small number of 0
or 1 sub-functions which cannot be dealt with by coset-coding alone could be
included. For the error-detecting case, using an AMD code as in [2] seems to
be feasible. However, for the error-correcting case, it is not clear which kind
of correction strategy to use to deal with the effects of the linear coset-coding
scheme. Nevertheless, if such functions are the only ones of interest, one must
be aware that an error correcting or an error detecting code is sufficient by itself.
Relaxing the Notion of Non-Malleability
In the model for the WT II described in this paper, we require that Eve cannot
obtain any bit of information on the messages sent over the channel. This
strong security notion can be relaxed. Indeed, one could be satisfied even if
Eve learned only a bounded amount of bits. This is possible if we consider
generalized Hamming distances [11] instead of the dual distance d⊥ of the code
considered in the linear coset-coding scheme. For i ∈ N, the generalized distance
di is such that if Eve cannot obtain more than di bits per message, then she
gains no more than i−1 bits of information per message. For instance, d1 = d
⊥.
In the same spirit, one could relax the notion of non-malleability. After
the tampering experiment, we could state that either the decoding procedure
returns the original message or it enables to learn a bounded number of bits of
information on this message. Using our construction, it is easy to build another
scheme that would satisfy this requirement. One would only have to replace
dual distances by generalized distances.
5 Conclusion
We established in this paper a parallel between Non-Malleable Codes and the
Wire-Tap Channel. This relation enabled us to build an efficient non-malleable
scheme, w.r.t. a family of bit-wise independent functions, that is neither error-
correcting nor error-detecting.
Considering bit-wise independent tampering is a worthwhile first step for
NMC. An interesting open problem would be now to build schemes that are
non-malleable w.r.t. larger families of functions.
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